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Abstract
Contrary to expectations, the EU’s eastward expansion in 2004 did not sound the death
knoll of nationalism in the region; rather, it signalled its reinvention and, in some
respects, reinvigoration. In this paper, we examine three ways in which nationalism has
been redefined in Hungary and Poland in the context of EU enlargement. First,
consensus on the desirability of European unification has lessened the importance of
left/right party divisions; in its place, the ‘‘nation’’ has provided a fulcrum for inter-
party contestation. Second, EU integration has provided nationalists in the region with
a backdoor for realising old nationalist ambitions of national reunification across the
porous borders of the EU. Third, we examine the way radical nationalist organisations
in Hungary and Poland increasingly define themselves in opposition to the EU.
Keywords: Nationalism, EU enlargement, Poland, Hungary, East Europe.
W i t h t h e a c c e s s i o n of eight East European states to the
European Union in 2004, there was renewed hope that the nationalism
that had plagued the region throughout the 20th century would be on
the wane in the 21st century. The European Union’s supra-national
structures and ethos would ultimately supplant the outmoded model
of the nation-state, already weakened by the inexorable advance of
globalisation. The EU proffered not only a new form of European
belonging antithetical to the particularistic national attachments
rooted in the past; it also required its newest aspirants to get their
national houses in order as a condition of membership in the new club.
For their part, the new member states enthusiastically embraced
Europe’s official endorsement of their Europeanness and rewrote their
laws to conform to new European norms. The EU thus presented its
newest members with an opportunity to turn over a new leaf and
abandon the divisive nationalism of the past. But at the same time, it
provided these same members with opportunities for nationalist
recidivism. Contrary to both the spirit and letter of the EU, accession
opened a backdoor for East Europe’s unreconstructed nationalists to
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pursue their nationalist ambitions. They did this not (just) by evading
EU policies and pronouncements, but by engaging and adapting them
in new and imaginative ways. Indeed, the vagueness of the European
project gave scope to would-be nationalists to fashion their national
and nationalist agendas in ways that could appear (or be made to
appear) ‘‘European’’.
The purpose of this paper is to explore three ways in which this
backdoor nationalism has emerged in Hungary and Poland over the
past two decades. First, we consider the reconfiguration of the left/
right political space along a new axis of national/non-national differ-
ences. A broad consensus on the desirability (if not inevitability) of
European unification has contributed to the flattening of nascent left/
right cleavages. In its place, the ‘‘nation’’ has re-emerged as a conve-
nient fulcrum for inter-party contestation. This has not manifested
itself as the virulent nationalism of the early 1990s but rather a softer
version that distinguishes those political parties claiming to represent
‘‘the nation’’ from those who, by extension, do not. Second, we turn to
the instrumental use of European discourses and institutions to ac-
complish the nationalist aims of kin-state politics. EU integration has
provided nationalists in the region with an opportunity to realise old
nationalist ambitions of national reunification in a new postmodern
way. This is not actual reunification through territorial revision, but
rather symbolic reunification across the porous borders of the EU’s
newest member states. If these first two trends represent a certain
taming of nationalism, the third trend we identify points to its
radicalisation. In the third part of our paper we turn to the emergence
and strengthening of radical nationalist organisations in both Hungary
and Poland. EU accession in these countries coincided with the
marginalisation of far-right wing nationalist parties and the emergence
of radical nationalist groupings operating outside the political establi-
shment. More recently, a number of these organisations have tried
their hand at electoral politics with some impressive results. We sug-
gest that the taming of mainstream nationalism is not unrelated to the
unleashing of these more virulent forms of nationalism operating at
the margins of the political establishment.
Together, these three developments signal important changes in
the trajectory of nationalism in Hungary and Poland, and East Europe
more generally. The EU would like to stifle nationalism, but para-
doxically it has opened up a new political space in East Europe for its
elaboration and indeed resurgence. By selectively examining different
dimensions of nationalism and European enlargement side-by-side,
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we posit a casual – but not causal – relationship between European
unification and the transformation of nationalism. Our argument is
that European institutions, regulations, and discourses provide diverse
audiences and users with opportunity structures that serve multiple
purposes not always consistent with the intentions of their framers (on
political opportunity structures see, eg, Gamson and Meyer 1996,
Marks and McAdam 1996, Princen and Kerremans 2008). This is
a political opportunity structure approach in a weak sense: we do not
suggest that nationalism in the region can be explained with sole
reference to EU opportunity structures; rather, we simply observe
new developments in nationalism in the shifting contexts of European
enlargement. Our framework is exploratory, not explanatory. Contrary
to expectations, the accession of the EU’s newest members did not
sound the death knoll of nationalism in the region; rather, it signalled its
reinvention and, in certain respects, reinvigoration. The European
Union has not impeded nationalism’s advance but rather re-channelled
it – albeit inadvertently – into new and vigorous forms (Smith 1992,
Guibernau 2007).
Nationalising political space
Since the collapse of communism in 1989-1990, EU unification in
East Europe has consistently been seen as a ‘‘return to Europe’’
(Batory 2002, p. 526). This framing captured not only the political,
economic, and cultural dimensions of the re-incorporation of East
Europe into the fold of Europe, but the moral necessity of it as well.
As such, there was little room for dissent on the question of East
Europe’s relationship to Europe. As the political landscape of the
region was reconfigured to accommodate new and different voices,
there was consensus that East Europe’s rightful home was in Europe.
To be sure, there was debate about EU unification across all the
candidate countries. There were differences of opinion over the timing
and mechanics of accession, debate over the often exacting conditions
imposed by the EU as part of the accession process, and variation in
the intensity of support coming from Euro-sceptics and Euro-
enthusiasts (Batory 2002, Kopecky´ and Mudde 2002). But the
expression of differences in these and other ways was constrained in
two important ways. First, the basic proposition of EU unification was
unquestioned and unquestionable: East Europe was, and always had
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been, a part of Europe. The incorporation of East Europe into the
institutional structures of the EU was thus simply the status quo ante
recognition of this state of affairs. Unification in this sense was a moral
imperative (Vachudova 2005, p. 4). Second, the debate that did take
place did not underscore left/right cleavages but rather blurred them.
The perceived triumph of neo-liberalism over decades of ruinous
state-socialist planned economies, dramatically distilled in the events
of 1989, left little room for questioning the ideological foundations of
the EU (Vachudova 2005, p. 181, pp. 183-184). The basic features of
the post-communist landscape – parliamentary democracy, neoliberal
economy, and civil society – were preordained by the self-proclaimed
victors of the Cold War (Bryant and Mokrzycki 1994, p. 6). These
assumptions were not questioned in East Europe but rather embraced
as an organic expression of the region’s own values and norms. The
transition to democracy thus enabled new forms of political compe-
tition, but did not lead to critical debate about the value of Western
free market principles (Graff 2009). Unification, in this sense, was also
a socio-economic imperative.
The question of accession became a centrist project promoting
open markets, reduced public spending, and fiscal responsibility
(Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003, pp. 64-66, Marks et al. 2006, p.
163, p. 166). Through conditionality, the candidate countries were
confronted with the hard constraints of accession, a list of things that
needed fixing before they could join the European club (Vachudova
2005, p. 4). These constraints had the effect of flattening differences
that might otherwise have taken shape along a left/right axis. Indeed,
the only genuine opposition to EU unification came from (and
simultaneously defined) fringe elements in the political spectrum
(Kopecky´ and Mudde 2002, pp. 315-317, Marks et al. 2006, p. 163,
p. 166, Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002, pp. 26-28, Beichelt 2004, pp. 34-
35). Those left/right differences that did emerge among more main-
stream parties were often difficult to predict, with successor communist
parties singing the praises of the free market whilst their opponents
on the ‘‘right’’ clung to the elaborate but crumbling social-welfare
apparatuses of state socialism (Bakke and Sitter 2005).
But whilst these socio-economic dimensions of accession were not
subject to serious debate, other axes of difference did emerge to give
shape to the political field across the region. ‘‘The nation’’ for one
came to be employed as an effective discursive device for differen-
tiating those parties that represented national interests from those
parties that, by extension, did not (Palonen 2009, pp. 321-324).
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In a context where the ideological differences between the economic
left and right were increasingly unclear, it became expedient for
political competitors to draw on national (and sometimes nationalist)
justifications to create the appearance (if not reality) of difference. In
both Hungary and Poland, we see how incipient left/right differences
were increasingly eclipsed by national/non-national distinctions along
the long road to European unification.
Our argument here is that the EU provided not only the in-
stitutional context but also, in some ways, the discursive resources and
even incentives for the reconfiguration of political space in national
terms. EU conditionality established the institutional terms of ac-
cession; EU discourses elaborated its spirit. We are interested in the
first instance not in the mechanics of conditionality but rather in the
ways in which the accession process more generally has constrained
the discursive possibilities for debate. Since the basic underlying
principles of unification were taken as given, political debate shifted
instead to the familiar terrain of the nation. A constraint was trans-
formed into an opportunity: a national framing of EU accession
offered its users ideological ballast, strategic advantage and, ultimately
wider application and salience for the nation.
Hungary
This reconfiguration of the political landscape in Hungary is most
strikingly evidenced by the transformation of the Young Democrats
(Fidesz) from a left-leaning youth organisation with minimal parlia-
mentary representation in the early 1990s to a national right wing
governing party by the end of that same decade (Kiss 2003, Fowler
2004a, Bakke and Sitter 2005, Waterbury 2006). In spite of its
centrality to the events of 1989, Fidesz fared poorly in the 1990
elections. Hungary’s first post-communist government was formed
instead by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), Hungary’s
centre-right torchbearer of the nation. Four years later, Fidesz pegged
its electoral hopes on an alliance with the left-liberal Free Democrats
(SZDSZ); this resulted in a poor showing for both parties. The
victorious Socialists squeezed Fidesz and SZDSZ out of their
crowded quarters on the left; the right, effectively abandoned by the
Democratic Forum, was left to more fringe elements (the populist
Smallholder Party [FKGP] and the nationalist Justice and Life Party
[MIE´P]) that were either unable or unwilling to gravitate to the
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centre. In the following years, Fidesz recognised an opportunity to
claim the right (and the nation that came with it) as its best strategy
for future electoral success. This strategy paid off and in the 1998
elections Fidesz was catapulted into the government where it remained
until 2002. Fidesz consolidated its position in opposition as Hungary’s
centre-right party of the nation and decisively reclaimed power in the
2010 elections by staying this national course.
This new and improved Fidesz rebranded itself as the party of the
Hungarian nation. Whether in government or opposition, Fidesz
publicly claimed to represent the nation’s interests. This nation in
Hungary spills out beyond its borders which were truncated by the
peace treaties that concluded World War I. The national question in
Hungary is thus understood and articulated as one that requires the
defence of the interests of all ethnic Hungarians, irrespective of where
they live. Fidesz appointed itself the official spokesperson for this
nation; in so doing, it denied the role to others (Palonen 2009, p. 324).
There was only one nation; therefore there could be only one official
defender of that nation, and that was to be Fidesz (Weaver 2006, pp.
131-134, Szabo 2007, p. 139, Korkut 2009, p. 7). By usurping this role,
Fidesz claimed to represent the widest, most undifferentiated swath of
the electorate (Szabo 2007, pp. 132-133; see more generally Verdery
1994, pp. 11-13). Before, Fidesz had struggled to define itself; now, the
nation provided the leverage it needed to distinguish it from its rivals.
A nascent left/right divide in Hungarian politics was thus trans-
formed into a divide between those forces that represented the nation
and those forces that, by extension, did not, could not, or would
not represent it (Szabo 2007, pp. 145-54, Hanley et al. 2008, p. 410,
Palonen 2009, pp. 321-324, Batory 2010, p. 37, p. 42). The nation
served as a discursive tool for transforming all manner of political
issues into national ones (Verdery 1994, p. 13). Social issues were
recast as questions about the welfare of the nation, foreign policy
decisions were subordinated to the national interest, and elections
were contested on the terrain of the nation. Not unexpectedly,
therefore, the question of European unification was ripe for national
framing. European conditionality and the moral and economic impera-
tives of ‘‘returning to Europe’’ stifled debate on the socio-economic
foundations of unification (Vachudova 2005). In Hungary, there was
a general convergence in the orientation of all parties to the pro-
market policies of the EU (Batory 2002, pp. 529-530, pp. 533-534).
Even MIE´P, the most outspoken critic of the accession process, was
reluctant to oppose unification outright (Kopecky´ and Mudde 2002,
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pp. 307-310, Minkenberg 2007, p. 270). Differences over the pace of
accession between so-called Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-sceptics did
not consistently congeal along the ill-formed pathways of left/right
cleavages but rather tended to reflect the strategic concerns of
particular parties as they traded places between government and
opposition (governing parties pushed the pace of accession whilst
the same parties in opposition often tried to put on the brakes [Lakner
2004, pp. 140-146]). It was in this relative vacuum of left/right
variation that debate over European unification was increasingly
framed in national terms (Batory 2002, pp. 528-530, Fowler 2004b,
pp. 57-68; see more generally Vachudova 2005, p. 184, Marks et al.
2006, pp. 156-157; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009, pp. 290-291).
At first glance, the nation would appear to be a strange bedfellow
for parties nominally committed to European unification. Indeed,
Europe represented the vision of a postnational future for the
continent. But in the idiom of the nation, Fidesz adroitly melded its
European agenda with its national interests. For the MSZP, EU ac-
cession represented progress; for Fidesz, unification offered an oppor-
tunity to develop and promote the interests of the nation (Batory 2002,
pp 528-529, Fowler 2004b, pp. 73-76; see also Waterbury 2006, pp. 484-
485). The three pillars of Hungarian foreign policy articulated and
embraced by successive governments on both the left and right through-
out the 1990s were rapprochement with the neighbours, defence of the
interests of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries, and
European unification (Fowler 2001, pp. 2-3). For the MSZP, finding an
appropriate balance between promoting the interests of transborder
Hungarians without offending the national sensibilities of their neigh-
bours or the non-national sensibilities of the EU posed no uncertain
challenge (on the inherent contradictions of these policy goals, see Toth
2003, p. 215, Saideman and Ayres 2008, p. 112, p. 128). For Fidesz,
however, the same challenge presented itself as an opportunity: by
championing Hungary’s neighbours’ bids for EU accession (Saideman
and Ayres 2008, p. 124), Fidesz was able to mollify its neighbours whilst
offering the Hungarians in the neighbouring countries the promise of
a new (European) home in a borderless Hungarian nation, all without
jeopardising Hungary’s own chances for EU unification. The EU in this
sense was not an obstacle for Fidesz’s pursuit of its national objectives; it
was a vehicle for it. European unification was pitched as Hungarian
national unification.
Thus the interests of the nation could be invoked and deployed to
differentiate Fidesz’s approach to accession from that of its rivals
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(Grzymala-Busse and Innes 2003). Such a framing proved useful in
a political field characterised by its inchoateness. The nation provided
Fidesz with a discursive idiom for distinguishing itself not only from
its rivals’ bland talk about ‘‘progress’’ but more importantly from
their implicit neglect of national interests (Palonen 2009, p. 323). In
this way debate about the EU became a national question.
Poland
As in Hungary, the debate about the EU in Poland was constrained
by an underlying political consensus on the imperative of EU
accession. All successful mainstream political actors held favourable
views of the integration process and wanted the country to become
a member of the EU as soon as possible. During the 1995 campaign
for the presidency, for example, both Lech Wa1e˛sa and Aleksander
Kwas´niewski stressed EU membership as a crucial foreign policy goal
even though they represented radically opposing political traditions
and polarised the electorate with regard to most other subjects (Zubek
1997, Raciborski 2003, p. 223). In parliamentary elections, too, post-
communist politicians (the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]), post-
Solidarity moral conservatives (including Solidarity Election Action
[AWS]) as well as pro-business neo-liberals (like the Citizen’s Platform
[PO], established in 2001) all favoured EU accession. Radical parties
were more openly critical but still shared the basic assumption that
Poland had a right to ‘‘return to Europe’’, even if only to increase their
distance from Russia. With this convergence around European unifi-
cation came a quasi-consensual endorsement of the new market-oriented
socio-economic model that the EU represented. Mainstream parties in
Poland became less prone to describe their position as an ideological
choice or as the representation of a particular class-based interest; rather,
they sought to broaden their appeal to the widest possible share of the
electorate. Nationalism thus began to function as a new form of interest
articulation, a politics that symbolically included the entire nation in the
decision-making process whilst more or less ignoring socio-economic
concerns (Cirtautas 1994).
Polish political parties made use of nationalism as a key strategy of
differentiation most clearly in the parliamentary elections of 1997 and
2005. On both these occasions, ‘‘the nation’’ emerged as the central
axis of political competition. In 1997, nation-talk became the central
framing strategy of a party that presented itself as the successor of
332
jon e. fox and peter vermeersch
Solidarity, the AWS (Sk1odowska and Do1bakowska 2004, Migalski
et al. 2006, p. 168). The AWS defined its targeted voter audience not
in socio-economic terms but in cultural, religious, and moral ones.
This was a nationalist gesture that served two important purposes:
first, it attempted to halt rising fragmentation among conservative-
minded politicians by gathering a diverse group of politicians under
a single banner; and second, it offered an opportunity to brand the
moral viewpoints of the incumbent social democrats, the SLD, as un-
Polish, thereby challenging them without questioning the deeper
assumptions on which their socio-economic policies were based.
The SLD had introduced measures that were consistent with the
principles of a globalising free market. The AWS, unable or unwilling
to counter the SLD with a leftist discourse, instead discreetly
endorsed a neo-liberal agenda whilst more openly promoting the
notion that Polish nationhood once again needed defending (Ost
2005). This was a remarkable strategic choice for the AWS given
the party’s Solidarity base and historical defence of labour interests.
By the 1997 elections, the party abandoned the substance of its
Solidarity heritage and relied almost exclusively on its form – the
symbols, visual images and slogans of the opposition movement of
the 1980s (‘‘we, the nation’’ against ‘‘them, the communists’’, ‘‘we, the
Catholics’’ against ‘‘them, the atheists’’, and so on). The original
Solidarity movement’s use of nationalism was oblique; it had been
a broad movement seeking to achieve the particular goal of better
worker representation by challenging the representational quality and
(national) legitimacy of the communist regime. Solidarity’s implicit
nationalism served to demonstrate that it could rely on broad
networks of mobilisers among a large swath of the electorate that
extended well beyond its worker base. The AWS, in contrast,
inverted this strategy. It did not aim to represent workers in labour
negotiations, but rather sought to broaden its appeal to farmers and
the middle-class electorate to achieve direct power over policy-
making processes in a broad range of fields. In doing so, it pursued
a strategy that echoed and amplified the discourses and tropes of the
old Solidarity whilst simultaneously moving away from its ideol-
ogical underpinnings.
This strategic nationalism did not disappear from mainstream
political discourse in the following years despite the fact that the
AWS eventually collapsed under the strain of internal division.
Several constituent parties (the AWS was an umbrella organisation)
left the group to form new parties in preparation for the 2001
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elections. Nationalism re-emerged as a mobilising strategy in the
period between 2001 and 2005 when some of these post-Solidarity
politicians regrouped around two new parties: Law and Justice (PiS)
and the Citizen’s Platform (PO). In the run-up to the elections of
2005, conservatives from PiS put aside their ideological differences in
favour of nationalist rhetoric aimed at unifying them and differen-
tiating them from their rivals (Sk1odowska and Do1bakowska. 2006).
PiS wanted to rekindle the patriotic feelings of the Poles, their sense of
traditional moral values, and their faith in Catholicism in order to
differentiate itself from its main competitors, the SLD and the PO.
The party campaigned for full-scale social and political renewal to
lead the nation away from its communist past and back to its real roots
(Markowski 2006). The campaign reframed its moral, religious and
ideological stances in explicitly national terms. PiS representatives
insinuated (unjustly, as it turned out) that the father of the PO’s
presidential candidate, Donald Tusk, had been a volunteer in the
Wehrmacht during the Second World War (and as such a traitor to the
nation). Political opponents from the PO and the SLD who supported
euthanasia, abortion, or same gender marriage were cast as ‘‘anti-
Polish’’. Its own positions, ranging from harsher lustration laws,
a new constitution, tax cuts, anti-corruption measures, and tough
criminal-justice policies, were presented as matters at the heart of the
Poles’ national identity. This nationalist image was strengthened in
2006 when PiS formed a coalition with the League of Polish Families
(LPR), a radical right-wing party.
Like the AWS in 1997, PiS’s campaign to ‘‘revert to nationalism’’
was useful for distinguishing it from the self-declared left-wing party,
the SLD. PiS also used the nation frame to avoid locating its own
policy proposals (especially those dealing with the economy) on a left/
right scale. Positions that may have appeared to the unbiased observer
as leftist were characterised by PiS as simply ‘‘Polish’’ or, according to
one of the party’s slogans, ‘‘closer to the people’’.
PiS was even more effective than the AWS in linking its nationalist
and its anti-communist agendas. The SLD fared very well in the 2001
elections but after that was plagued by corruption scandals. PiS
emerged in 2005 to replace the SLD as the most important main-
stream party. To that end, PiS did not merely argue that the implosion
of the SLD was caused by internal party corruption; it argued that
corruption itself was a symptom of the refusal of the SLD to break
with the communist past and defend the Polish nation against the
foreign (Russian) interests still deeply entwined with that communist
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legacy. PiS was thus able to align its protest against corruption with
nationalism. It argued that the SLD’s corruption showed that the social
democrats were still deeply implicated in a well-defined network of
people with roots in the (essentially foreign) communist establishment.
PiS also linked Polish nationalism with Euro-scepticism. This
helped the party differentiate itself not only from the SLD but also
from the main pro-business party, PO. The SLD had been the party
that had negotiated the terms of EU accession and PO represented the
business interests that benefited most from that agreement. PiS could
not deny that EU membership for Poland had been the SLD’s major
achievement, but it could promote a different (and more diffident)
relationship with the EU. The party framed its more critical stance as
a fundamental concern for Poland’s national interests. This Euro-
scepticism came at a relatively low cost since it was clear that it was
not meant to, and in fact could not, jeopardise membership itself.
Therefore it was ostensibly only aimed at strengthening the position
of those who wanted more attention for Polish interests within the
Union (Vermeersch 2010).
In unanticipated ways, then, the EU accession process provided the
context for the reconfiguration of the political space according to the
logic of national differences. In Poland, as in Hungary, the nation was
used as a discursive means for establishing difference in an otherwise
murky political terrain. EU unification did not bear witness to a
lessening of nationalist tensions; rather, it channelled and transformed
the nation in new and imaginative ways, reinventing and reinvigorat-
ing it in the process.
Using Europe
European unification not only revitalised the nation as a frame for
marking political difference, it also helped its users achieve their
national (and sometimes nationalist) objectives. The nationalist viol-
ence of the 20th century discredited (but did not eradicate) violence as
the method of choice for matching nations with states. The European
Union proposed a different solution to the national(ist) problem by
proclaiming the obsolescence of nation-states and the dawn of a postna-
tional era. The East European candidate countries were willing to forego
violent means to the resolution of national conflicts, but they were less
predisposed to renouncing their nationalist aspirations wholesale. They
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instead found other plans for the EU. For Hungary and Poland, the EU
did not have to dampen their nationalist ambitions; on the contrary, it
could be an unwitting ally in achieving those objectives.
The European Union supplied the candidate countries with
a veritable toolkit for resolving their national problems (see Keating
2004, Keating 2006). The EU’s decentring of states and the bound-
aries that contained them made it possible to imagine, among other
things, greater cultural nations reuniting across increasingly porous
boundaries (Zielonka 2001, pp. 525-526). By challenging the hege-
mony of states, the EU afforded greater manoeuvrability not just to
supra-state institutions but to sub- and trans-state actors as well (Paasi
2001, pp. 13-14; Keating 2004, pp. 373-374, Hoppe 2005, pp. 22-23,
Gupta 2008, pp. 68-69). To be sure, the activities and ambitions of the
EU were postnational in spirit, intended (if not expected) to engender
a new European form of consciousness to supersede retrograde
national attachments. But the opening up of this new and imperfectly
defined institutional space had unintended consequences (Korkut
2009, p. 4, pp. 12-13). Some political actors, including certain
Hungarian and Polish nationalists, were able to cash in on the
perceived dismantling of the state not to supersede national attach-
ments but to redefine and even revive them. Through the elaboration
of minority rights regimes and policies aimed at co-ethnics in
neighbouring countries (Brubaker 1996, Fowler 2004c, Saideman
and Ayres 2008), nationally-minded politicians in both Hungary and
Poland were able to promote and pursue distinctly national objectives.
The EU of course sought compliance in the area of minority pro-
tection and attempted to temper some of the candidate countries’
more excessive policies aimed at co-ethnics (commonly referred to as
kin-state politics) (see, eg, Kelley 2004, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
2005). But the exceedingly complex, ambiguous and, at times, contra-
dictory nature of EU policy (coming from multiple institutions with
amorphous and overlapping remits) ultimately provided the targets of
those policies with room to manoeuvre (Kymlicka 2008, Sasse 2006).
Domestic political agendas that might at first glance have appeared
incompatible with the requirements of accession were nevertheless
creatively manipulated to appear compatible (or at least not incom-
patible) with those requirements (Saideman and Ayres 2008). These
agendas were of course not always realised according to plan. But they
were fully articulated and at least partially institutionalised within the
larger context of EU enlargement. Such was the case with nationalism
in Hungary and Poland.
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Hungary
The national question in Hungary does not, in the first instance,
concern ethnic minorities within its borders but rather ethnic Hun-
garians beyond its borders. Since the reconfiguration of the region’s
political landscape at the end of World War I stranding millions of
ethnic Hungarians in the newly created neighbouring countries, the
question of the fate of the Hungarians beyond the borders has been
the dominant national question. Hungary annexed half of the lost
territories in World War II through an alliance with Nazi Germany.
After the war (and the return of the annexed territories), an ideology
of communist internationalism stifled open debate on the question.
Old nationalist grievances were unfettered by the changes that
swept across East Europe in 1989 and 1990. In place of the discredited
revisionism pursued in the first half of the century, however, Hun-
garian nationalists began to imagine and articulate new modalities of
national reunification. But now Hungary, like the other candidate
countries, had to reconcile its political aspirations within the in-
stitutional structures and discursive strictures of the European Union.
As a first step in the mid 1990s, Hungary concluded Basic Treaties
with its neighbours in which it formally renounced claims on its
neighbours’ territories in exchange for assurances of increased rights
and protection for the Hungarian minorities living there. These
gestures of good will were intended as much for the EU as they were
for their historically apprehensive neighbours (Linden 2000, pp. 128-
137, Vachudova 2005, pp. 147-151). This compliance with European
constraints (in exchange for joining the EU’s waiting list) put to rest
earlier aspirations for territorial revisionism.
It was not long, however, before Hungarian politicians and
intellectuals on both sides of the border began to view European
unification as an opportunity for, and not an obstacle to, Hungarian
unification (Kis 2001, p. 239, Weaver 2006, pp. 177-78, pp. 191-192;
Saideman and Ayres 2008, pp. 123-125). The EU’s weakening of
political boundaries afforded Hungarian nationalists an opportunity to
articulate and, to a certain extent institutionalise, a new deterri-
torialised vision of national reunification (Cserg}o and Goldgeier
2004, pp. 27-28, Fowler 2004b, p. 61, p. 69). Since the changes in
1989 and 1990, Hungary not only pursued its own path of European
unification but also advocated the integration of neighbouring coun-
tries into the EU as well (Cserg}o and Goldgeier 2004, pp. 27-28,
Fowler 2001, pp. 2-3). This support for its neighbours was borne not
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out of good will, but rather Hungary’s self-professed obligation to
protect the well-being and interests of the Hungarian minorities in
those countries (Saideman and Ayres 2008, p. 124). For all main-
stream parties in Hungary, EU accession promised Hungary’s in-
corporation into Europe; for Fidesz and its allies, accession was
simultaneously the path to Hungarian national unification (Fowler
2004b, Waterbury 2006).
The fuzzy terrain of minority rights provided Hungary with one
useful means for defending and promoting the interests of the
Hungarians in the neighbouring countries (Waterbury 2008, Deets
2006). Adherence to minority rights and, indeed, acceptance of inter-
national monitoring of these norms was increasingly regarded as ‘‘a
test of a country’s readiness for European integration’’ (Kymlicka
2008, p. 14). But European discourses and policies on minority rights
were sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate varied interpretations
whilst conveniently providing the international legitimacy for but-
tressing individual interpretations. Hungary, like other candidate
countries, readily signed on to the requisite minority rights instru-
ments whilst simultaneously authoring its own minority rights laws.
Its 1993 Minorities Law strengthened the country’s reputation as an
enlightened, pro-Western frontrunner in the accession process. It also
provided Hungary with a legal platform for the elaboration of its own
brand of collective rights, legitimated with reference to international
minority rights instruments like the Council of Europe’s Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Such references
were selective, reflecting Hungary’s national interests whilst ignoring
other international laws and protocols on minority rights. Neverthe-
less, by appearing to meet and exceed European norms and standards
on minority rights, Hungary’s law could serve not only as a showpiece
for general European consumption but, more importantly, as a new
(and European) precedent that could be invoked to champion the rights
of the Hungarians in the neighbouring countries (Schwellnus 2005,
p. 60). Inconsistency, ambiguity, and even contradiction in international
minority rights regimes provided fertile ground for Hungary and its
antagonists to advocate minority rights in ways that suited their own
national interests (Deets 2006, pp. 419-421, pp. 434-441).
But before the EU would become part of the national solution, it
would first be a part of the national problem. Uncertainties and
discrepancies in the timing of the accession process threatened to
divide rather than unite the Hungarian nation. Hungary’s entry into
the Schengen Zone ahead of its neighbours placed a new European
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border between Hungary and Hungarians in Romania, Ukraine, and
the former Yugoslavia (Toth 2003, pp. 209-211; Waterbury 2008,
pp. 222-226). While Schengen weakened the internal boundaries of
the EU member states, it reinforced the external boundaries that sep-
arated Europe from everyone else. This dilemma motivated Hungarian
nationalists to seek alternative remedies to national division. The Status
Law, sponsored by Fidesz and passed in 2001, was a package of en-
titlements designed to symbolically and institutionally incorporate
Hungarians in the neighbouring countries into the fold of the Hungarian
nation. Transborder Hungarians could apply for special Hungarian
Identity Cards that would grant them privileged access to Hungary’s
labour market along with a series of incentives and entitlements designed
to promote Hungarian national development in their countries of origin.
The Status Law extended extra-territorial quasi-citizenship rights to
the transborder Hungarians on the basis of putatively shared ethnicity
(Fowler 2004c).
In so doing, it tested the limits of the EU’s vision for a post-
sovereign Europe. From the EU perspective, the principle of shared
ethnicity enshrined in the Status Law clashed uncomfortably with its
strictures against ethnic discrimination (and favouritism). Hungary
responded to these objections by extending the law’s guest worker
provisions to all claimants in the neighbouring countries irrespective
of ethnicity (effectively denuding the law of its raison d’eˆtre). In this
regard, complying with EU requirements for unification trumped
Hungary’s aspirations for national unification (Kemp 2006, Waterbury
2006). But the law’s Hungarian Identity Card survived the amend-
ments, thereby leaving transborder Hungarians with a means for dis-
playing their attachment to the mother country and cashing in on some
of its more modest symbolic and material benefits.
The next attempt to incorporate the transborder Hungarians into
the fold of the nation came in 2004 from the World Federation of
Hungarians (with political backing from Fidesz) when it recycled
plans for dual citizenship for transborder Hungarians that had
originally been on the table in the mid 1990s (Culic 2006). The new
plans were pitched as reflecting (if not pioneering) the EU’s com-
mitment to the deterritorialisation of citizenship. A sceptical EU,
watching from the sidelines, however, breathed a sigh of relief when
the 2004 referendum on dual citizenship failed owing to low voter turn-
out (Kova´cs 2006, pp. 440-443). No referendum was needed, though,
for the latest incarnation of dual citizenship after Fidesz secured a
two-thirds parliamentary majority in the 2010 elections. With its new
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majority, Fidesz simply passed a new citizenship law that abolished
earlier residency requirements for citizenship for ethnic Hungarians.
Dual citizenship is now on offer for transborder Hungarians.
Whilst the EU has had some success in asserting the institutional
limits of post-sovereignty, it has been more difficult for it to rein in
some of the excesses of nationalist discourses. Indeed, Hungarian
nationalists beat the EU at its own game by appropriating and
adapting postnational European discourses to do the work of Hun-
garian nationalism. This is perhaps best evidenced in Hungarian
nationalists’ invocation of a ‘‘Europe of Regions’’. Vaguely defined
and inconsistently institutionalised, a Europe of Regions offered
Fidesz a discursive opportunity for expressing nationalist ambitions
(Keating 2004, pp. 376-380). In theory, a Europe of Regions was
intended to promote decentralisation in order to facilitate adminis-
trative coordination and economic development between different
levels of government both within and across states (Paasi 2001, pp. 13-
15, Brusis 2002, p. 534, p. 539). In practice, a Europe of Regions was
discursively malleable enough to afford various actors with a language
for expressing sub- and trans-state forms of nationalism (Batt 2002,
p. 10, Keating 2004, pp. 376-380; see more generally McGarry and
Keating 2006). Nationalists could thus pursue their goals by by-
passing the states in which they were situated in favour of these other
forms of political organisation (Hoppe 2005, pp. 13-14, pp. 22-23).
Viktor Orba´n, Fidesz’s president and prime minister of Hungary from
1998 to 2002 and again since 2010, creatively rewrote a ‘‘Europe of
Regions’’ into a ‘‘Europe of National Communities’’ (Cserg}o and
Goldgeier 2004, pp. 27-28, Batory 2010, pp. 40-41). The new
decentralised vision of a Europe of Regions with its weakened states
and strengthened forms of non-state governance provided both
a discursive and ultimately institutional space in which nationalists
could operate and indeed thrive (Cserg}o and Goldgeier 2004, pp. 25-26,
Hoppe 2005, p. 13, Gupta 2008, p. 68).
The European Union was alternately an impediment and facilitator
of the nationalist ambitions of different political actors within its
borders (Hoppe 2005, p. 13, Gupta 2008, pp. 63-64). On the one hand,
nationalism and its retrograde derivatives were incompatible with the
EU’s plans for a postnational Europe. On the other hand, the
European Union and its various discursive and institutional accoutre-
ments served as a resource for sub- and trans-state actors intent on
pursuing nationalist agendas. Hungarian nationalism responded and
developed not only to the constraints of the requirements of European
340
jon e. fox and peter vermeersch
accession but also more creatively to the vaguely defined vision of
post-sovereignty in Europe.
Poland
In Poland, too, the EU served as a resource for nationalists who
aspired to realise the symbolic reunification of the nation across state
borders. In this case, however, the focus was not on Poles in new EU
states; rather, attention was turned further east to Poles in Ukraine
and Belarus (Burant 1993). These territories, collectively known as the
kresy or ‘frontier lands’, had been part of Poland before the Second
World War and are still viewed by many Poles as part of their nation,
or even a mythic homeland (Czaplin´ski 2000).
The kresy has not been a central concern to Polish nationalism for
some time. After World War II, Polish nationalists were focused on
creating a new Polish nation out of the people who lived within the
new borders of the state. Even the communists committed themselves
to this task and sought to develop what some have called ‘‘ethnic
communism’’, a communist system of and for ethnic Poles (Snyder
2003, pp. 202-214; see also Zaremba 2001). The new post-war Polish
demography lent its support to this idea: the composition of Poland’s
population had changed fundamentally through the wartime extermi-
nation of large parts of the Jewish and Roma populations and the
Soviet-sponsored population transfers of 750,000 Poles from Soviet
Ukraine to Poland and three million Germans from Poland to
Germany. Communist Poland introduced ‘‘repolonisation’’ campaigns
to deal with ‘‘Germanised Poles’’ and other minorities (Majdaczyk
1998). At the same time, links between Poland and the ethnic Poles
beyond the borders were suppressed.
In the context of EU accession, however, the question of the kresy
gradually re-emerged with Polish nationalists elaborating increasingly
outspoken kin-state politics in two ways. First, they stressed the need
to demand increased protection for (Polish) national minorities in
Belarus and Ukraine as a nationalist concern that was consistent with
the EU’s external policy goals of democracy promotion and good
relations with the new neighbouring states (Browning and Joenniemi
2008). A broad range of Polish politicians became strong advocates of
the EU’s neighbourhood policy through the promotion of closer
relationships with the eastern neighbours, in particular with Ukraine.
Such relations were also tied to certain requirements in the field of
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minority protection. This conditionality created an opportunity to
merge nationalist ideals with the larger European aims of democra-
tisation and the fostering of international stability in the larger
European space beyond state borders.
Second, kin-state politics was given increased attention in the
context of the EU’s external border regulations. The more the EU
influenced the elaboration of Poland’s new visa regimes and border
regulations intended to ensure effective monitoring of the EU’s external
borders, the more Polish politicians turned to kin-state rhetoric and
policy in an effort to exempt transborder Poles from these new regimes
and regulations. Concern for co-ethnics abroad thus complemented the
return of nationalist discourses to the centre of party competition. PiS
went the furthest in this regard by campaigning for the introduction of
an identity card for co-ethnics abroad, the Karta Polaka (‘‘Pole’s
Charter’’) (Fowler 2004c), a document issued to foreign nationals on
the basis of Polish ancestry and some knowledge of the Polish
language. The Karta, not unlike the Hungarian Identity Card, offered
transborder Poles entry privileges, such as refunds on Schengen visas,
access to Polish schools and universities, and permission to do
business in Poland. In 1999, plans for the Karta were voted down
in the Sejm by politicians who viewed it as a potential liability to the
EU accession process. A newer version of the bill met a similar fate in
2001 (Kaczyn´ski 2003). After EU accession, however, and once PiS
took over the government, the Karta Polaka returned to the agenda. It
was finally passed into law in 2007, taking effect the following year
(Dytkowski 2009). PiS had a double interest in pursuing this. First, it
was a matter that fitted well with the nationalist ideas that charac-
terised the rest of the party’s political programme and, second, it
helped distinguish PiS from the social democrats of the SLD (the
party that had successfully negotiated Polish accession to the EU), but
without calling into question EU membership itself.
In short, kin-state politics in Poland became a more important feature
of nationalist mobilisation not despite the EU, but because nationalist
politicians were able to turn the new constraints of the EU enlargement
to their advantage. The more EU membership for Poland became a
realisable goal, the more it became a threat to existing ties between
Poland and the ethnic Poles in the east, particularly in Ukraine and
Belarus. Kin-state politics has not been the main focus of nationalism in
Poland, but it is nevertheless telling that it came into view in conjunction
with the timing of EU accession.
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Radicalising nationalism
The European Union has provided nationalists in the region with
a means (and sometimes legitimacy) for pursuing their objectives.
Thus far we have argued that this has lead to a resurgence of
nationalism, but also a softening of it as it struggles to find a home
within the institutional and discursive confines of the EU. At the same
time, however, there has been a hardening of nationalism initially
outside of these confines, but more recently back within them. EU
accession coincided with the demise of Hungary and Poland’s far right
political establishment. But as these parties were sidelined, new fringe
elements began to emerge outside of these traditional political con-
straints. Much of the recent headline grabbing nationalist activity
in the region, from violence against Roma in Hungary to the anti-
Semitic activities of skinheads in Poland, has occurred not only
outside mainstream and EU political norms and structures but in
many cases in explicit defiance of them. By 2010 in Hungary, however,
the most notable of these new fringe elements made its debut on the
main stage of Hungary’s political establishment with an impressive
showing in the parliamentary elections. Whether operating inside or
outside these constraints, however, these reconstituted extremist
elements (in contrast to their predecessors) do not attempt to conform
to EU standards but to contradict them. These are EU opportunity
structures not enabling mainstream nationalists but acting as a foil
against which extremist aspirations are articulated and legitimated.
The international, cosmopolitan, and/or ‘‘Jewish’’ character of the
European Union (with its stooges in Budapest and Warsaw) provides
this next generation of extremists with the grist for their nationalist
mills.
Opposition to the EU thus defines and is defined by this new
nationalist extremism in the region (Kopecky´ and Mudde 2002,
pp. 315-317, Marks et al. 2006, p. 163, p. 166, Sz}ocs 1998, p. 1098-
1102). Whilst the nationalism of the mainstream has adapted its
message not to offend European ears, the nationalism of the new
extreme has adapted its own message to offend European ears. In both
Hungary and Poland, extremist parties that toned down their nation-
alist excesses found themselves on the losing side of elections in the
build up to accession. Around the same time extra-parliamentary
elements stepped up their own rhetoric in an all out attack on the
enemies of the nation. Territorial revisionism, violence against the
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Roma, and anti-Semitism do not sit comfortably with the EU. But such
themes do appear to resonate with a sizeable number of ordinary
Hungarians and Poles frustrated with the ineptitude of the political
classes and the broken promises of transition (Minkenberg 2002,
pp. 340, Minkenberg 2007, pp. 261-262, pp. 273-278). For these
organisations and their supporters (the perceived if not actual losers of
the transition), the nation, presented in all of its historical and
territorial glory, is the ultimate antidote to the disruptive trans-
formations of the past decades (Minkenberg 2002, pp. 344-346,
p. 356, Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007, pp. 30-34).
This is the radicalisation of nationalism at the fringes of main-
stream politics. For these extremist elements, the EU demands
conformity to an entity and ethos that are seen as inimical to their
goals and aspirations. European constraints have effectively pushed
these elements away from conventional politics where they can
formulate and express their increasingly virulent views with renewed
fervour. Nationalism on the margins has thus hardened in the recent
context of EU enlargement.
Hungary
Hungary’s first post-communist version of firebrand nationalism
came from Istva´n Csurka and his Hungarian Truth and Life Party
(MIE´P). Csurka began his political career as a Hungarian Democratic
Forum MP. But his hints at territorial revision and veiled references to
Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracies earned him an early reputation as an
extremist and, ultimately in 1993, expulsion from the party. MIE´P
was established shortly thereafter but did not manage to cross the 5%
threshold for parliamentary elections until 1998 (Bozoki and Kriza
2008, pp. 226-228). Following four years in opposition, MIE´P has
since been unable to achieve the 5 % of the vote necessary to gain
parliamentary representation (Fowler 2003, pp. 803-804).
MIE´P presented itself as embracing all things Hungarian and
rejecting all things non-Hungarian (Bozoki and Kriza 2008, pp. 222-
225). Its glorification of Hungary’s past occasionally found expression
in calls for recapturing that past through future territorial revision
(Weaver 2006, pp. 100-109). The enemy within who would foil these
grandiose ambitions were non-Hungarians, usually understood (im-
plicitly but sometimes explicitly) as Jews and Roma. The Jewish
enemy in Hungary was at the same time part of the Judeo-Bolshevik
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cabal, typically embodied in the European Union and the United
States (Weaver 2007, pp. 181-182, Bozoki and Kriza 2008, pp. 222-
223). Hungarian parties on the left were viewed as the local repre-
sentatives of this global conspiracy; those on the right were viewed
somewhat more forgivingly as the sometimes well-intentioned but
more often ineffective and unfortunate victims of these same forces.
In the years leading to accession, MIE´P was faced with reconciling
its extremist agendas against the centripetal forces of mainstream
politics. This led to inconsistency, contradiction, and vacillation: calls
for territorial revision were replaced by pronouncements accepting
Hungary’s current borders (Weaver 2007, p. 182); openly anti-Semitic
remarks were toned down, qualified, and retracted (Sz}ocs 1998,
p. 1098, Mudde 2005, p. 177); and even the EU, public enemy number
one, was recast as Hungary’s new friend, helping it achieve its ambi-
tions of national reunification (Minkenberg 2007, p. 270, Minkenberg
and Perrineau 2007, p. 46). Such waffling risked alienating MIE´P’s
extremist base without enhancing its legitimacy among Hungary’s
more mainstream political players. MIE´P had to contend with a general
electorate wary of sending the wrong message to Brussels on the eve of
accession (Mudde 2005, pp. 164-165, Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007,
p. 43, p. 46). For MIE´P, EU unification coincided with its electoral and
political demise.
The rise of the extreme right outside mainstream politics has
followed closely on the heels of MIE´P’s marginalisation (LeBor 2008,
p. 35). In 2003, Jobbik Magyarorsza´gert (Movement for a Better
Hungary), joined in 2007 by its paramilitary wing, the Magyar Ga´rda
(Hungarian Guard), began filling the extremist vacuum left by MIE´P.
Jobbik shared this increasingly crowded terrain with the Hatvannegy
Va´rmegye Ifju´sa´gi Mozgalom (Sixty-Four Counties Youth Move-
ment, established in 2001), the Nemzeti }Orsereg (National Guard,
established in 2007), and a number of less formal groupings without
clear organisational structures or names to match (on typologies of
extreme right movements, see Minkenberg 2007, p. 264, Mudde 2005,
pp. 166-168, Bozoki and Kriza 2008, pp. 217-218). The majority of these
groupings in Hungary are anti-establishment and anti-parliamentarian
(Sz}ocs 1998, pp. 1098, Mudde 2005, pp. 162-163, pp. 166-168); as such,
they operate free from the constraints of mainstream politics. Where
MIE´P’s half-hearted conformist gestures foretold its demise, the explicit
refusal of these extremist elements to play by the rules gave them free
rein (if not indeed the justification) to express and propagate a more
unrepentant radicalism. These are the sorts of groupings suspected to
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be behind some of the recent violence against Roma in Hungary. Their
positioning outside the political establishment was not only shaped by
their extremist views but simultaneously shaped those views as well
(Mudde 2005, p. 177, Sz}ocs 1998, p. 1098, p. 1105).
Jobbik, however, the most significant of these groupings, has
bucked this trend by consistently (and successfully) seeking political
office. Following early failures and some spotty success in local
elections, Jobbik caught national and international attention when it
captured 15% of the popular vote and three seats in the 2009 elections for
the European Parliament. This was the prequel to the 2010 Hungarian
elections when Jobbik received nearly 17 % of the popular vote, only
a few of percentage points behind the previously governing Socialists.
By combining its extremism with these dramatic electoral successes,
Jobbik and its now outlawed Ga´rda emerged as the most visible,
organised, and coherent elements of the extreme right in Hungary. In
contrast to other extremist groupings, Jobbik has planned its attack of
the establishment from the inside, but unlike MIE´P before it, without
diluting its extremism.
Jobbik promotes and perpetuates the cult of Trianon (the treaty
ending World War I which ‘‘dismembered’’ Hungary), licking past
wounds to justify future territorial claims, whilst aggressively pushing
a law and order agenda at home aimed at the supposed offenders of
law and order, the Roma. The European Union, in contrast, is the
favourite external enemy, representing the main 21st century threat to
national sovereignty (Ray 2009, p. 331-332). MIE´P’s worn image of
old men in polyester suits sporting unintentionally retro hair styles
has been replaced by the younger and internet savvy face of extremism
projected and managed by Jobbik and the Ga´rda. In appearance, the
Ga´rda’s penchant for uniforms with insignia harkening back to
a darker era is suggestive of the organisation’s subversive intent and
authoritarian tendencies. In tone, the differences are more substantial.
Where MIE´P’s waffling undermined its extremist credentials, Job-
bik’s extremism is unapologetic, making no concessions to Hungary’s
Roma, Jewish, or European nemeses, or to any of the niceties of
mainstream political correctness. Indeed, where MIE´P struggled to
play by the rules, Jobbik has drawn its fervour from breaking them.
Jobbik does not seek to refine its message for mainstream Hungarian
or European ears but to use its institutions to express an iconoclastic
shock and awe brand of politics. This is the public performance of
defiance. Where others have failed (or simply not attempted) to
reconcile extremism with the constraints of mainstream politics,
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Jobbik has turned a disadvantage into an advantage, becoming
a significant player in both European and Hungarian politics.
The political establishment in Hungary has reacted to the rise of
Jobbik with dismay. Fidesz’s reaction has been somewhat more ambiva-
lent. On the one hand, Fidesz has condemned Jobbik’s excesses and
reacted squeamishly to its tamer manifestations (LeBor 2008, p. 37). On
the other hand, Fidesz has flirted with Jobbik and the extreme right. In
the autumn of 2006 violent street protests erupted when then Socialist
Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsa´ny was caught on tape telling fellow
party members (in a closed meeting) that the party had lied in the run-
up to elections earlier that year. Extremist elements led by the Sixty-
Four Counties Youth Movement (with support from other elements)
quickly took to the streets in protests that culminated in the 23
October commemorations of the 1956 Hungarian revolution (Ahn
2007, pp. 117-120). These demonstrators shared the same goals as
Fidesz: Gyurcsa´ny’s resignation and the collapse of the Socialist
government. Fidesz, however, was ambivalent as to whether these
objectives should be pursued through parliamentary means, extra-
parliamentary means (with more volatile and potentially violent
street protests), or some combination of the two (Ahn 2007, pp. 118-
120, Bugaric 2008, p. 197).
Fidesz did little: the demonstrations fizzled, the Socialists re-
mained in power, the extremists displayed their extremism, and
Fidesz reinforced its proclivity for mainstream politics. To be sure,
Fidesz could expand its electoral base by courting the extreme right,
but doing so would run the risk of relinquishing its comfortable corner
on the mainstream nationalist market (Bozoki and Kriza 2008, pp.
226-128, LeBor 2008, p. 37). It has thus avoided direct association
with the extreme right’s causes cele`bres of territorial revision, anti-
Semitism, the vilification of Europe, and the damning of the Roma.
With its comfortable two-thirds parliamentary majority, it now has the
best of both worlds: Jobbik can give expression to Fidesz’s darker
repressed urges from the safe distance of its opposition benches whilst
Fidesz can deny any formal association with them. Fidesz preserves its
mainstream credentials. By casting the net widely with a softer (if not
insipid) and more inclusive brand of Hungarian nationalism, Fidesz
appeals to the largest swath of the electorate. The hardening of
nationalism on the extreme right thus has its counterpart in Fidesz’s
softening of nationalism within the confines of what is right and
proper in Hungarian and European politics (Minkenberg 2002, pp.
358-359, Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007, p. 43).
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Poland
Extreme nationalism in Poland has traditionally been a weak political
force. Although anti-Semitism and hatred of all things not Polish
inspired the interwar National Democrats (Endecja) (Porter 2002)
and other movements, after 1989 such radical rightwing organisations
did not regain popularity (Ost 1999). By the mid-1990s the consensus
among observers was that the extreme right had failed (Millard 1996,
Ost 1999). It consisted of myriad small parties, some more radical
than others, but with most unable to break the 5 % threshold needed to
gain parliamentary representation. The only radical right wing party
that managed to escape the margins and get into parliament on its own
was the Confederation of an Independent Poland (KPN) in 1991 and
again 1993. By the 1997 elections, however, severely weakened by
internal dissension, the KPN too had lost its parliamentary represen-
tation (Ost 1999, p. 98).
The results of the 1997 elections dramatically altered the national
political landscape. Solidarity Election Action (AWS), a new party
formed from several smaller parties on the right united by their strategic
nationalism, defeated the incumbent SLD. The AWS’s victory (to-
gether with the demise of the KPN) signalled the return of soft
nationalism to the political field and in so doing transformed the land-
scape in which radical nationalists manoeuvred. The response of the
radical right took two forms. One strand of extremists moved more
toward mainstream right-wing politics in pursuit of the more moderate
nationalism favoured and legitimated by the AWS. Both the AWS and
PiS after it welcomed these former radicals as long as they toned down
their rhetoric consistent with the demands of established right wing
nationalism. The AWS and PiS could not risk alienating their broad
voter base, which included the Solidarity trade union, an organisation
that had nationalist tendencies but also relied on a democratic ethos that
clashed with right-wing authoritarianism (Ost 1999, p. 107).
Poland’s most famous extreme right party, the League of Polish
Families (LRP, established in 2001), followed a similar trajectory of
increasing moderation. In the 2001 elections, the LPR had hoped to
become a considerable electoral force without abandoning its extrem-
ism. It captured nearly 8 % of the vote on a platform of radical
Euroscepticism including opposition to EU membership. Once EU
membership became a reality, however, its rhetoric shifted. Initial
opposition to accession was recast as a criticism of the terms of
accession. In 2006, together with the populist Self-Defence Party
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(Samoobrona), the LPR joined a coalition with the governing PiS.
Within a little more than a year, however, the coalition collapsed, and
the elections that followed left the LPR with just 1 % of the vote,
revealing its failure to win over nationalist voters from PiS or even
maintain its original electoral base.
At the same time, other extremists in Poland sought to preserve
their nationalist idealism by turning away from electoral politics
altogether and taking up direct movement activities, including the
organisation of rallies in small towns, the promotion of youth groups,
the establishment and operation of various media, and (at times
covert) involvement in groups such as skinheads and football hooli-
gans. The EU accession process sharpened the divide between
radicals who became part of a more moderate right wing political
force and those who turned away from established politics in order to
preserve their radicalism.
This radicalisation of nationalism outside electoral politics in-
cluded the activities of groups with varying degrees of organisation.
Less organised groups included skinheads, football hooligans, and
other fringe movements with anti-Semitic, homophobic, and racist
messages and graffiti. In some Polish cities (qodz´, for instance),
inflammatory inscriptions and symbols appeared not only on build-
ings associated with Polish-Jewish history (such as qodz´’s old syna-
gogue), but also on bus stops and blocks of flats in other parts of town
(Marciniak 2006, p. 615). Anti-Semitic slogans and symbols also
became increasingly visible among groups of football fans infiltrated
by skinhead organisations. Although this is hardly a new phenom-
enon, and something that by definition occurs at the margins of
society, it has gained new symbolic significance in the context of
Poland’s EU membership since racist and homophobic slogans now
appear next to graffiti denouncing migration and open borders. This
European context is further acknowledged in government attempts to
prevent the actions of these organisations. For example, a government
graffiti clean-up campaign in 2000 in qodz´ called Kolorowa Tolarancja
(Colourful Tolerance) was announced as an initiative to provide
Poland with a ‘‘passport to the family of free European nations’’
(quoted in Marciniak 2006, p. 628).
Radio Maryja is perhaps the most important example at the other
end of the spectrum. It is a well-organised network, outside electoral
politics, but with clear informal links to certain politicians. Radio
Maryja is an ultra-conservative religious radio station that broadcasts
its conservative Catholic spin on a wide variety of issues (Eaglin 2008).
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When it was established in 1991, it had a small number of devout
listeners; increasingly it attracts a largely elderly audience with
conservative political views. The station’s programming includes
lengthy prayer sessions and talk shows, and it encourages its most
radical listeners to speak out publicly with their political views.
Listeners and presenters routinely criticise Church-backed centrist
politicians, often peppered with anti-German, anti-European, and
anti-Semitic allusions. In 1998, the station claimed four million
regular listeners, comprised mostly of elderly people in rural areas
(Migas 2005). Some mainstream political parties, most clearly PiS in
the 2005 elections, have cautiously tried to use Radio Maryja to
mobilise their voting public. The radio station has responded to these
attempts by affirming its independence, whilst making it clear to its
listeners that they should support the most nationalist and religiously
conservative candidates. Even though Radio Maryja has avoided
direct involvement in institutionalised politics, it continues to present
a radical challenge to mainstream political discourse on a broad
number of issues, not least of all the question of the EU. It has linked
EU membership with abortion, secularism, Jewish interests, and
homosexuality, placing Poland’s membership in the EU at the centre
of an emotionally charged discussion about the ethical value of Polish
nationhood.
Equally well-organised is the All-Polish Youth organisation (M1odzie_z
Wszechpolska). This group was founded in 1989 as the successor to the
inter-war anti-Semitic youth movement of the same name. Its founder,
Roman Giertych (who later became the leader of the LPR), wanted to
reach out to a young generation of both urban and rural populations.
The organisation’s rhetoric contains allusions to anti-Semitism, vigor-
ous opposition to foreign ownership of anything deemed Polish, and
the depiction of Germany as a continuous and constant threat to
Poland. The All-Polish Youth links extreme nationalism with radical
Catholicism and anti-Europeanism (Strutyn´ski 2006, p. 132). The
enlargement of the EU, the separation of church and state, and the
more moderate nationalism that has risen in response to EU
demands have all prompted the All-Polish Youth to construct
a counter-discourse linking ethnic homogeneity and anti-gay politics
with anti-Europeanism (captured in a 2002 slogan that read
‘‘Paedophiles and pederasts are Euro-enthusiasts’’) (Graff 2008,
p. 35). The organisation, with a membership estimated at 3,000,
has received wide press coverage for its street protest activities
directed against sexual minorities. The boundaries between the
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organisation and mainstream electoral activism have not always been
clear. In the run-up to the 2005 elections, several members of the
All-Polish Youth ran on LPR lists and were indeed elected. But after
All-Polish Youth members were caught on video with outstretched
arms in Nazi salutes in 2006, the LPR responded by cutting ties with
them (Zmarz-Koczanowicz 2007).
Since the beginning of the EU accession process, Poland’s official
discourse has emphasised the country’s willingness to adapt to
European demands and expectations about transnational mobility,
Europeanisation, postnationality, economic liberalism and ethnic
diversity (Borneman and Fowler 1997, Schimmelfennig 2001,
Marciniak 2006). This official narrative has tempered (but not
eradicated) radical nationalism by seducing some of its key pro-
ponents into the fold of mainstream politics. At the same time,
however, it has fuelled a growing and virulent anti-European
nationalist counter-discourse outside electoral politics. Those parties
who entered into a coalition with PiS compromised their radicalism
and eventually their popular appeal. This opened the door for other
extremists outside electoral politics to challenge everything that
established politics stands for. They have answered the mainstream
consensus on European integration with a radically ethnicised
understanding of the interests of ‘‘the nation’’. Europeans are
portrayed as the allies of the enemy within: non-Catholics, sexual
minorities and ethnic minority populations, in particular Jews, gays,
and Roma. At the same time, their extra-parliamentary position has
provided them with leverage and legitimacy for distancing them-
selves from the alleged corrupting influence of organised, established
democratic politics.
Conclusion
We have examined three ways in which the European Union’s
eastward expansion has provided nationalists in Hungary and Poland
with opportunities to explore, adapt, and even step up their national
and nationalist ambitions. There is evidence of similar trends across
the region. In different ways and to varying degrees, nationalism has
come to define and delineate if not dominate cleavages between
mainstream parties from the Baltics to the Balkans. Kin-state politics
have become de rigueur across much of the region, with Romania,
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Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria all asserting their obligations to co-
ethnics in neighbouring countries. And the standard bearers of
extreme nationalism in Romania (the Greater Romania Party) and
the Czech Republic (the Republican Party) have met their electoral
demise at the same time that extra-parliamentary radicalism in
these same countries (evidenced in the activities of the New Right
in Romania and the Workers’ Party in the Czech Republic) has been
on the rise. There are other examples from the region, however, that
do not neatly fit within the framework we have presented. In
Slovakia, for instance, Robert Fico’s Direction–Social Democracy
party recently teamed up with Ja´n Slota’s Slovak National Party
(SNS) and Vladimı´r Mecˇiar’s People’s Party-Movement for a Dem-
ocratic Slovakia (L’S-HZDS) to give more radical nationalists
a cosy home within the confines of the Slovak governing coalition.
(That home, however, went up in smoke in the 2010 elections
following the poor electoral performance of both the SNS and L’S-
HZDS.) Next door in the Czech Republic, Va´clav Klaus has made
his ardent and caustic opposition to the EU the cornerstone of his
political career. And in the Baltics, nationalist politics continue to
be defined in large part in opposition to the presence of large
Russian minorities.
We do not interpret this local variation as weakening our argument.
It has not been our intention to present an exhaustive or watertight
typology of backdoor nationalism for the entire region. The variation
in the region draws attention to other ways in which nationalism
responds not just to the demands of European expansion but also to
the contingencies of local context at the same time. Our aim has been
to focus on the ways in which nationalism has been redefined and at
times reinvigorated in the context of European enlargement: the
European Union has provided the institutional structures and
discursive legitimacy for nationalists in the region to pursue old
agendas in new and imaginative ways. Without denying (or indeed
even considering) the effects of other influences on nationalism, we
have argued that the ways in which nationalism has been transformed
in the context of the EU’s eastward expansion cannot and should not
be ignored. This nationalist revival should not be viewed as
mere coincidence but rather as an unintended consequence of EU
enlargement. The EU was meant to rescue East Europe from the
excesses of its nationalist past; instead it has helped secure it
a nationalist future.
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Resume
Contrairement a` certaines attentes, l’elar-
gissement en 2004 de l’Union europeenne
vers l’Est n’a pas sonne le glas du nationa-
lisme dans cette region. Il l’a plutoˆt fait
revenir a` la surface et en quelque fac¸on
renforce. On examine a` partir des cas hon-
grois et polonais trois developpements. En
premier lieu l’accord consensuel pour l’en-
tree de l’Union europeenne a diminue l’op-
position entre droite et gauche ; en revanche,
la « Nation » est devenue un point de fixation
pour les luttes entre partis. Deuxie`mement,
l’integration europeenne a donne aux natio-
nalistes une entree laterale pour realiser de
vieilles ambitions de reunification par-dessus
les frontie`res poreuses des Etats de l’Union.
Troisie`mement, en Hongrie comme en Po-
logne, des organisations nationalistes radi-
cales apparaissent pour affirmer leur
opposition a` l’Union europeenne.
Mots cles: Nationalisme, E´largissement de
l’UE, Pologne, Hongrie, Europe de l’Est.
Zusammenfassung
Anders als erwartet, hat die Osterweiterung
der EU nicht zu einem R€uckgang des Natio-
nalismus in dieser Region gef€uhrt. Ganz im
Gegenteil, er ist publikumsf€ahig geworden
und verst€arkt aus ihr hervorgegangen. Die
ungarische und die polnische Situation
weisen drei M€oglichkeiten auf. Erstens hat
der allgemeine Konsens beim EU-Beitritt
hat die Unterschiede zwischen Rechts und
Links verringert. Die Nation wird Zentrum
der Parteik€ampfe. Zweitens hat der EU-Bei-
tritt den Nationalisten die M€oglichkeiten
gegeben, eine Wiedervereinigung €uber die
durchl€ocherten Grenzen der EU hinweg zu
erreichen. Drittens, sowohl in Ungarn als
auch in Polen, entstehen radikale, nationalis-
tische Verb€ande, um ihrem Widerstand ge-
gen die EU Gestalt zu geben.
Schlagw€orter: Nationalismus, EU-Erweiterung,
Polen, Ungarn, Osteuropa.
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